I. INTRODUCTION
Many industries are subject to regulation, whether by the federal government, the state, or both. Electric utility companies' retail rates are subject to regulation by the states, and their wholesale rates charged among enterprises involved in providing the electric power to retail sellers are regulated by the federal government.
1 Under the Federal Power Act of 1935 ("FPA"), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") is responsible for ensuring that rates for wholesale electric power sales and electric transmission are "just and reasonable." The "classic scheme" of administrative rate setting called for rates to be established unilaterally by the regulated companies and set forth in rate schedules of general applicability (i.e., "tariffs"), subject to oversight by the relevant administrative agency. 3 However, the federal government has regulated rates for goods and services transferred between businesses differently from the way rates between businesses and the public are regulated. 4 The Supreme Court has noted that "[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party charged were often sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a 'just and reasonable' rate as between the two of them." 5 With the FPA, Congress departed from a strict scheme of tariff-only rate regulation, 6 permitting wholesale arrangements between the parties to be established through individually-negotiated contracts, subject to FERC oversight. 7 Over the years, the number of FERC-regulated transactions has grown, and FERC and electric utilities have developed new contractual vehicles under which to transact. Among other innovations, FERC has established organized markets, instituted a market-based rate program, and ordered electric industry restructuring (i.e., unbundling of power and transmission transactions). In addition, FERC has required electric utilities offering transmission service to do so pursuant to a standardized tariff of general applicability, with rates established under the "classic scheme" of administrative rate setting mentioned above. 8 * J.D., Cornell Law School. Thanks to all those who provided comments on the ideas expressed in this article, and to the Maine Law Review and its editors for their work in the production of this article. All remaining errors are my own. 338-39 (1956) . 8. See New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (noting that FERC had proposed and adopted the requirement "that public utilities owning and/or controlling facilities used FERC's determinations in Devon Power. Because FERC has failed to recognize that the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption must apply to rates set forth in settlement agreements, those rates may be easily challenged. The effects may be far-reaching, particularly where such a large number of FERC rate proceedings are resolved through settlement.
II. RATE REGULATION UNDER THE FEDERAL POWER ACT AND THE MOBILE-SIERRA DOCTRINE

A. The Federal Power Act
Part II of the FPA 20 vests FERC 21 with jurisdiction over the electric utility industry, including over the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce, and facilities for such sales or transmission.
22 "[A]ny person who owns or operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of [FERC] under [Part II of the FPA]" is a "public utility." 23 Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA, 24 which provide for the regulation by FERC of rates for the sale and transmission of electric power, are the "bread and butter" of the FPA. 25 Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA are substantially identical to sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act ("NGA"), 26 and decisions construing the analogous provisions of the two statutes are interchangeable. 27 The fundamental command of these sections is that all rates charged must be "just and reasonable." 28 This standard is modeled on the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"), 29 which has required that charges for services rendered by common carriers be "just and (September 13, 1977) , the FPC ceased to exist and its regulatory functions were transferred to FERC, an independent agency within the Department of Energy that was activated on October 1, 1977. In this article, "FERC" generally will be used to describe both agencies.
22. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (2010 820-21 (1968) ). While NRG, Devon Power, and this article are primarily focused on the regulation of contracts for electric power and capacity under the FPA, cases interpreting the NGA are equally applicable to the arguments set forth herein. Likewise, the arguments set forth in this article are equally applicable to analogous contractual arrangements subject to regulation under the NGA. reasonable" and has prohibited "every unjust and unreasonable charge" for such services. 30 Public utilities generally have been subject to rate regulation due to their position as natural monopolies. 31 The paradigm that developed included regulation over both retail rates charged directly to the public and wholesale rates charged among enterprises involved in providing the goods or services offered by the retail seller. 32 Retail rates were generally regulated by the states or municipal governments, and the regulation of wholesale rates was taken up by the federal government, since the transmission or transportation involved was generally deemed to be interstate in nature. 33 The "classic scheme" of administrative rate setting called for rates to be set forth by the regulated utility company in rate schedules of general applicability (i.e., "tariffs"), based on the model applied to railroad carriers under the ICA. 34 This system was adopted by the federal government because the innumerable "retail transactions of railroads made the policing of individual transactions administratively impossible; effective regulation could be accomplished only by requiring compliance with a single schedule of rates applicable to all shippers." 35 However, the federal government has regulated rates for goods and services transferred between businesses differently from the way states and municipalities have regulated rates between businesses and the public. 36 The Supreme Court has noted that "[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party charged were often sophisticated business enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a 'just and reasonable' rate as between the two of them." 37 With the FPA and the NGA, Congress departed from a strict scheme of tariff-only rate regulation. 38 Under the FPA and NGA, Congress permitted wholesale arrangements between the parties to be established initially 30 . See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1(5)(a) (1988) . Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") in 1887 to regulate railroads. In 1906, the Hepburn Act applied the ICA to oil pipelines as well. Pub 301 (1974) ("The [NGA] was patterned after earlier regulatory statutes that applied to traditional public utilities and transportation companies and that provided for setting rates equal to such companies' costs of service plus a reasonable rate of return.").
through individually-negotiated contracts. 39 Protection of the public interest would be achieved through supervision by FERC of the individual contracts. 40 To that end, the FPA requires public utilities to file their individual contracts with FERC and grants to FERC the power to review rates subject to its jurisdiction that have been set initially by public utilities. 41 The relevant subsections here are FPA sections 205(c), 205(d), 205(e), and 206(a). Section 205(c) requires public utilities to file all rates and contracts with FERC. 42 Under section 205(d), changes in previously-filed rates or contracts generally must be filed with FERC at least sixty days before they go into effect. 43 However, FERC may under section 205(e) suspend the operation of a new rate for up to five months, pending a determination of the new rate's reasonableness. 44 If FERC has not reached a decision before the suspension period has expired, the filed rate shall go into effect, subject to a refund or adjustment to be made retroactive to that date. 45 Section 206(a) authorizes FERC to modify any rate or contract which it determines to be "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential." 46 In 1956, in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp. ("Mobile"), the Supreme Court explained that sections 205 and 206 are part of a "statutory scheme under which all rates are established initially by the [public utilities], by contract or otherwise, and all rates are subject to being modified by [FERC] upon a finding that they are unlawful." 47 However, FPA section 205 "purports neither to grant nor to define the initial rate-setting powers of [public utilities]." 48 Instead, the FPA (1) defines FERC's review powers, and (2) imposes duties on public utilities as are necessary for FERC to effectuate its powers. 49 FERC's powers are defined by sections 205(e) and 206(a). Under section 206(a), FERC may set aside and modify any rate or contract which it determines to be "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential." 50 The Court in Mobile stated that this was "neither a 'rate-making' nor a 'rate-changing' procedure. It is simply the power to review rates and contracts made in the first instance by [public utilities] and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy them." 51 Section 205(e) only adds to this basic power the "further powers (1) to 39 . See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 338-39; Verizon, 535 U.S. at 479. When compared to the ICA, relatively few wholesale transactions were regulated under the NGA, and they typically required substantial investments in capacity and facilities for the service of a particular gas distributor. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 339. Such circumstances demanded individual arrangements between jurisdictional natural gas companies and their customers, natural gas distributors. The limitations on public utilities are set forth in section 205(c) and 205(d). Section 205(c) requires rate schedules and contracts in force to be filed with the Commission. 53 Section 205(d) requires all changes in such schedules and contracts to be filed with FERC at least sixty days before they go into effect. 54 The Mobile Court explained that section 205(d) was a prohibition, not a grant of power.
55
Otherwise valid changes to a contract cannot be put into effect without giving the required notice to FERC. 56 However, the FPA does not say under what circumstances a public utility can make such a change.
57
In Mobile, the Court concluded that FPA sections 205 and 206 do not establish a rate-changing procedure or constitute a mechanism for initiating rate "proceedings."
58 Section 205 does not provide for the filing of rate "proposals"; it provides only for notice to FERC of the rates established by the public utility and for review by FERC of those rates. 59 If a public utility has the power to make a change to a rate schedule or contract, then the change is effectuated upon compliance with section 205(d)'s notice requirement. 62 the Supreme Court addressed the authority of FERC to modify rates that had been negotiated bilaterally and set forth in contracts. In Mobile, the Court rejected a natural gas pipeline's argument that NGA section 4's requirement that all new rates must be filed with FERC authorized such pipelines to unilaterally change existing contracts. 63 As explained above, the NGA did not grant extra-contractual power to jurisdictional pipelines. 64 If a contract does not grant either party the unilateral right to make changes to the contract, no such right exists. (noting that under section 4 of the NGA, otherwise valid changes cannot be put into effect without giving the required notice to FERC). As the D.C. Circuit has explained, " [t] he contract between the parties governs the legality of the filing. Rate filings consistent with contractual However, the Court in Mobile noted that NGA section 5 authorizes FERC to investigate rates "upon complaint," as well as on its own initiative. 66 The Court reasoned that although the jurisdictional natural gas pipelines were not enumerated among the list of entities that might file a complaint with FERC seeking the commencement of an investigation, "there is nothing to prevent them from furnishing to [FERC] any relevant information and requesting it to initiate an investigation on its own motions." 67 If FERC concludes after an investigation and hearing that the rate in a natural gas pipeline's contract is "so low as to conflict with the public interest, [FERC] may under [NGA] § 5(a) authorize the natural gas company to file a schedule increasing the rate."
68
In Sierra, the Supreme Court applied the holding from Mobile to the analogous provision of the FPA-section 205. 69 The Court concluded that a public utility could not unilaterally file a new rate under FPA section 205(d) that was contrary to the terms of an effective contract. 70 However, Sierra involved an issue not present in Mobile-when FERC, under FPA section 206(a), was authorized to find that an existing contract rate was unlawful and to fix a new lawful rate. 71 The Court explained that FERC could not find that an existing contract rate was "unreasonable solely because it yields the public utility less than a fair return on net invested capital."
72 Faced with the question of how FERC must evaluate whether an existing contract rate is just and reasonable, the Court explained:
[FERC's] conclusion appears on its face to be based on an erroneous standard . . . .
[W]hile it may be that [FERC] may not normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain . . . . In such circumstances the sole concern of [FERC] would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest-as where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory. 66. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1938)). NGA section 5(a) states that a complaint may be brought by "any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company." 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1938). The Court described these entities as "those who represent the public interest" and "those who might be discriminated against." Mobile, 350 U.S. at 345. FPA section 206(a) does not enumerate or limit entities that may file a complaint. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1938 (emphasis added, citation omitted). The Court noted that the purpose of the power given to FERC by FPA section 206(a) is the protection of the public interest, as distinguished from the private interests of the utilities. Id. at 355 (citing 16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a)). Therefore, a contract is not "unjust" or "unreasonable" simply because it is not profitable to the public utility. Id.
From these two cases, the eponymous "Mobile-Sierra doctrine" was born. 74 The doctrine acts as a presumption when such rates are investigated pursuant to FPA section 206(a). 75 As the Court has subsequently explained, under the MobileSierra doctrine, FERC "must presume that the rate set out in a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the 'just and reasonable' requirement imposed" by the FPA. 76 The presumption is only overcome if the contract seriously harms the public interest; that is, where the contract might (1) impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, (2) cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or (3) be unduly discriminatory. 77 Indeed, "[t]he regulatory system created by the [FPA] is premised on contractual agreements voluntarily devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in circumstances of unequivocal public necessity." 78 In neither case did the Court find that the public interest required the existing rates to be reformed.
79
Both Mobile and Sierra involved attempts by sellers to change rates set forth in existing bilateral contracts negotiated by the parties, and where the contracts did not otherwise permit such changes. 80 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Mobile-Sierra presumption applies where rates are set forth in instruments other than individually-negotiated bilateral contracts, or contracts Responding to Justice Stevens's dissent, see id. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the Court explained that it likely had never before used the phrase "Mobile-Sierra doctrine" because the understanding of the holdings in Mobile and Sierra was uniform and no circuit split arose concerning its meaning until the Ninth Circuit's erroneous decision in the cases on review, Pub Cir. 1983) . One commenter has stated that "it could be said that it would be easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a utility to increase a rate protected by the MobileSierra rule." Gentile, supra note 78, at 356. It has been observed that it is more difficult to overcome the public interest presumption than to meet the business judgment standard used in bankruptcy cases. that specifically permit rate changes. In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division ("Memphis"), the Court held that parties could include in contracts the right to unilaterally change rates at will. 81 The Court distinguished the case from Mobile, noting that in Mobile, the natural gas pipeline had contractually bound itself to furnish gas throughout the contract term at a particular price and had "bargained away by contract the right to change its rates unilaterally." 82 However, the agreement at issue in Memphis did not state a single fixed rate, but included a rate provision that amounted to the pipeline's "'going' rate," reserving to the pipeline the power to make rate changes subject to the procedures and limitations of the NGA. 83 The Court found that the pipeline, when filing a new rate with FERC, simply sought to assert, in accordance with the notice procedures in the NGA, its rights expressly reserved to it by contract. 84 In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court referred to the rule from Memphis as permitting parties to "contract out of the Mobile-Sierra presumption" by including in their contracts a provision that would permit one or both parties to unilaterally establish a new rate that would supersede the existing contract rate.
85
The Supreme Court has stated that Memphis is consistent with the lead role of contracts in the FPA's regulatory scheme. 86 However, absent the presence of a "Memphis clause," the Mobile-Sierra presumption remains the default rule.
87
Although the Court in Memphis did not, for purposes of its analysis, draw a distinction between rates set by bilateral contract and rates set forth in a tariff of general applicability, the arrangements at issue in Memphis involved such tariffs. 88 The Court noted that FERC had promulgated regulations requiring natural gas 81 pipeline companies to convert from using individual bilateral agreements to a "tariff-and-service-agreement" system. 89 Under the tariff-and-service-agreement system, natural gas pipelines must adopt system-wide "tariffs" that establish terms and conditions of service for their customers and rates for different classes of customers. 90 The tariff is not itself an agreement or contract between the pipeline and any customer. Customers must execute their own agreements with the pipeline. Instead of individually tailored contracts between pipelines and their customers, pipelines and customers execute "service agreements" containing references to rates set forth in the tariff's rate schedules of general applicability and incorporating the tariff's general terms and conditions. 91 In Memphis, the Court was satisfied that the parties to such arrangements could permissibly reserve for natural gas pipelines the right to change their rates. 92 The Court believed that it was not unlikely that customers would have agreed to be charged a "going rate" that could be changed consistent with the notice provisions under NGA section 4(d).
93
The innovation of Memphis clauses and the introduction of the tariff-andservice agreement regime for natural gas pipelines resulted in fewer Mobile-Sierra doctrine issues for the natural gas industry. 94 However, the electric utility industry did not convert to a tariff-and-service agreement system for electric transmission service until FERC No Rule, regulation, exception or condition such as tax, commodity price index, wholesale price index, purchased gas cost adjustment clauses or other similar price adjustments or periodic changes shall be included in the rate schedule or any other part of the tariff which in any way purports to effect a modification or change of any rate or charge specified in the rate schedule, or the substitution therefor of any other rate or charge: Provided, however, a natural-gas company may state in the service agreement or in rate schedules filed pursuant to § 154.52 that it is or will be its privilege, under certain specified conditions, to propose to the Commission a modification, change or substitution of the then effective rate or charge: Provided further, That no such clause may effectuate a change in an effective rate or charge except in the manner provided in Section 4 of the Natural Gas Act, as amended, and the regulations in this part. with FERC before they go into effect; instead, market-based rate sellers must file quarterly reports summarizing each of the contracts into which they have entered. 101 In 2000 and 2001, prices for electricity in the western United States rose dramatically. As a result, retail utilities entered into long-term contracts with market-based rate sellers that locked in rates that were very high by historical standards. 102 After prices began to return to normal levels, many retail utilitypurchasers asked FERC to modify the contracts, contending that the contracts should be reviewed without Mobile-Sierra's public interest presumption that the rates are just and reasonable. 103 FERC disagreed, applied the public interest presumption to its review of the contracts, and determined that the purchasers could not overcome the presumption. 104 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that because the market-based rate agreements had not been initially reviewed by FERC, the public interest presumption did not apply to the challenges. 105 In addition, the Ninth Circuit found that even if the presumption applied, the standard for overcoming the presumption is different when a purchaser challenges a high rate. 106 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
107
On its way to resolving the questions presented, the Court in Morgan Stanley reiterated and clarified several points about the Mobile-Sierra presumption that are relevant here. First, the Court noted, as it had in Mobile and Memphis, 108 that the FPA permits public utilities to set jurisdictional rates with electric power customers through individually-negotiated bilateral contracts as well as through tariffs of general applicability. 109 For tariffs, as opposed to individually-negotiated contracts, FERC traditionally reviewed rates under the "cost of service" method, ensuring that a public utility covers its costs plus a rate of return sufficient to attract investment. 110 Both individual contracts and tariffs of general applicability are subject to the FPA's notice and filing requirements. 111 The Court next addressed how application of the Mobile-Sierra presumption fits within the FPA's requirement that jurisdictional rates be "just and reasonable." The Court noted that since 1956, FERC and the courts of appeals referred to two differing modes of review: one with the Mobile-Sierra presumption, i.e., the "public interest standard"; and the other without, i.e., the "just and reasonable standard."
112
The Supreme Court explained that, notwithstanding this nomenclature, the "public interest standard" was not a different standard from the statutory "just and reasonable standard." 113 Instead, the Court concluded, the "public interest standard" refers to the differing application of the just-andreasonable standard to freely negotiated rates. 114 Thus, FERC's review of rates under the FPA's just and reasonable standard must begin with a threshold inquiry: whether the rate at issue is the result of bilateral (or multi-party) negotiations and bargaining. If so, FERC must apply the Mobile-Sierra presumption and can only make a finding that the existing rate is unjust or unreasonable-and, thereby, fix a new rate-where the existing rate seriously harms the public interest.
115
Application of the presumption is appropriate because, "[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party charged are often sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a 'just and reasonable' rate as between the two of them." 116 The Court in Morgan Stanley explained that Sierra provided "a definition of what it means for a rate to satisfy the just-andreasonable standard in the contract context."
117 However, if the rate under review is not the result of bilateral (or multi-party) negotiations-or if the parties to the arrangement state that the Mobile-Sierra presumption does not apply-FERC would perform its review without applying the presumption and review the rate under cost of service (or other) principles.
118
Establishing that the Mobile-Sierra presumption should be applied when rates are set through a negotiated agreement, the Court in Morgan Stanley answered the first question presented for review, holding that the FPA's just and reasonable standard is not applied differently depending on when a rate is challenged. 119 If a rate is one to which the Mobile-Sierra presumption should apply, the presumption applies each time the rate is reviewed by FERC. The FPA does not require FERC to review the rate under cost of service principles before the rate can be reviewed 348, 355 (1956) . In Sierra, the Court outlined three instances where a rate might harm the public interest: (1) impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, (2) cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or (3) 119. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 545; see also Tewksbury & Lim, supra note 100, at 461 (explaining that Mobile indicates that the statutory structure of the FPA and NGA does not support distinctions between newly proposed and already existing rates for purposes of determining whether the public interest presumption should apply); Bress, Gergen & Lim, supra note 98, at 301 ("In a regulatory scheme grounded on the ability of 'sophisticated businesses' to manage their own affairs and protect their own interests, there is no need for FERC to have an initial opportunity for plenary review before presuming that contract rates are just and reasonable."). subject to the Mobile-Sierra presumption. 120 The Court stated that it was proper in a regulatory scheme to review rates set by negotiated contracts by evaluating whether the rates seriously harm the public interest, not whether the rates are unfair to one of the parties that voluntarily entered into the contract. 121 Thus, FERC may abrogate a valid contract only if that contract harms the public interest.
122
Turning to the second question presented for review, FERC found that the Mobile-Sierra presumption applies equally regardless of whether the rate is challenged by purchasers of wholesale electricity rather than by sellers (as had been the case in Mobile and Sierra). 123 The Court noted that the three factors identified in Sierra-where a rate might (1) impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, (2) cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or (3) be unduly discriminatory-were not all directly applicable to a challenge brought by a purchaser, 124 and that the three factors from Sierra were not an exclusive list. 125 Where the challenge is brought by a purchaser, the primary concern is likely whether the rate imposes an excessive burden on that customer, not other customers (as in Sierra's second prong).
126 However, the fact that the customer is the challenger does not transform the "excessive burden" prong into an inquiry as to whether the customer pays a cost above the public utility's marginal cost, in effect reverting to a form of cost-based analysis. 127 The Court concluded that the FPA intended to reserve FERC's power to abrogate negotiated contract rates only for those extraordinary circumstances where the public would be 120. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 545-46. 121. Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted). 122. Id. at 548. The Court noted that FERC possesses the authority to set aside a contract if there is unfair dealing at the contract formation stage, e.g., fraud, duress, or market manipulation. Id. at 547, 552-55. However, the Court cautioned that that was no reason that FERC should be able to abrogate a contract on these grounds without a finding of a causal connection between the unlawful activity and the contract rate. Id. at 554-55. If a causal connection is established, then the Mobile-Sierra presumption should not apply. Id. at 555.
123. Id. at 548. The logic from Mobile establishes that the Mobile-Sierra rule is rate-neutral. See Gentile, supra note 78, at 363-65 (discussing earlier court of appeals cases that found that the MobileSierra doctrine protects high rates as well as low rates). Moreover, FERC's market-based rate regime eliminates a policy rationale that may be used for differentiating between so-called "low-rate" and "high-rate" cases because neither the buyer nor the seller enjoys the protections of the regulatory compact. See Tewksbury & Lim, supra note 100, at 469-70. But cf. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 55 F.3d 686 (1st Cir. 1995) (suggesting that the application of the public interest presumption might be more relaxed in non-low-rate cases (such as Mobile) or in order to protect third parties); Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 993 F.2d 937 (1st Cir. 1993 ). For a discussion of the Northeast cases, see Gentile, supra note 78, at 367-73 (noting, in an article published prior to Morgan Stanley, that the Northeast decisions might be the most significant Mobile-Sierra cases since 1956).
124. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 548 (citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) ). In a market-based rate regime, under which the regulatory compact has been eliminated, the first prong from Sierra-i.e., impairing the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service-would not be applicable. 
129
In NRG, the Supreme Court resolved that application of the Mobile-Sierra presumption does not depend upon the identity of the person challenging the rate at issue-i.e., whether the challenger is a party to the contested agreement, or a third-party. 130 The NRG case is discussed below, including the underlying FERC proceedings in Devon Power, review by the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court, and FERC's orders on remand.
A. Proceedings at FERC: Devon Power LLC
The NRG case arose out of New England's difficulties in ensuring adequate electric power supplies and maintaining the reliability of the region's electric transmission grid.
131
For many years, the ISO-New England ("ISO-NE") 132 imposed on retail utilities an "installed capacity" ("ICAP") requirement, 133 requiring utilities to maintain specified amounts of ICAP based on their peak loads plus a reserve margin. 134 For years, New England's capacity market has been "rife with problems"
135 and "the supply of capacity was barely sufficient to meet the region's demand. 133. In Maine PUC I, supra note 19, the D.C. Circuit noted that utilities generally purchase more capacity than is necessary to meet their customers' demand for electricity in order to ensure that the utilities are able to respond adequately to unexpected fluctuations in demand. utilities made several attempts to solve this problem.
137
In 2003, FERC directed the ISO-NE to develop a new market mechanism that would separately set prices for capacity in different geographical sub-regions in order to encourage construction of new capacity in the sub-regions with greater capacity shortages. 138 In March 2004, the ISO-NE proposed a locational ICAP ("LICAP") mechanism that would set capacity prices for four separate subregions. 139 FERC established hearing procedures before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").
140
In June 2005, the ALJ issued an Initial Decision largely accepting the ISO-NE's proposal. 141 Several parties filed exceptions to the ALJ's Initial Decision; FERC subsequently heard arguments, and thereafter established settlement procedures to allow the parties to develop a revised market proposal.
142
On March 6, 2006, a settlement was reached by 107 of the participants; however, eight participants opposed the settlement. 143 The Settlement Agreement established a "Forward Capacity Market" ("FCM") under which there would be annual price-setting auctions for capacity, held three years in advance of when the capacity would be needed. 144 Each retail utility would be required to acquire . Among other aspects of the proposal, the ISO-NE would establish a demand curve that set the amount of ICAP that must be procured and the price for that capacity. Id. The D.C. Circuit noted that the term "demand curve" is misleading because, ordinarily, a demand curve is a model of the relationship between prices and consumer preferences in a free market. Maine PUC I, supra note 19, at 468 n.3. However, under the ISO-NE's proposal, the "demand curve" was an artificial construct that administratively determined the prices that must be paid for various quantities of capacity. Although the transition payments were included among the issues presented to the D.C. Circuit and the enough capacity to meet its share of the total installed capacity requirement-i.e., the minimum level of capacity needed to maintain the reliability of the grid, as determined by the ISO-NE. 145 The FCM proposal contained a locational component: before each auction, the ISO-NE would determine capacity zones by identifying transmission constraints.
146
Of importance here, § 4.C of the Settlement Agreement provided that challenges to both transition-period payments and auction-clearing prices would be reviewed under "the 'public interest' standard of review set forth in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v The Supreme Court granted certiorari in NRG to determine whether MobileSierra's public interest standard applies to a "contract rate" regardless of the identity of the party challenging the rate. 153 The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's judgment insofar as it rejected application of the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption to non-contracting parties. 154 The Court explained that if FERC itself must presume that a rate that results from fair, arms-length negotiations is just and reasonable, so too must non-contracting parties. 155 The Mobile-Sierra presumption applies "because well-informed wholesale-market participants of approximately equal bargaining power generally can be expected to negotiate just-and-reasonable rates." 156 Although the Court determined that the Mobile-Sierra presumption applied to third-party challenges, it pointed out that the doctrine did not overlook third-party interests: rates may be rejected when they would seriously harm the consuming public. 157 Moreover, limiting the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to challenges by contracting parties would undermine the stability of contractual arrangements that the doctrine sought to ensure. 158 However, the Supreme Court found that neither the D.C. Circuit nor FERC had previously determined whether the auction clearing prices qualified as "contract rates" to which the Mobile-Sierra doctrine must apply.
159 Accordingly, the Court remanded that issue to the D.C. Circuit; and, if the rates were not "contract rates," the D.C. Circuit was directed to resolve the additional issue of whether FERC possessed discretion to treat such rates analogously. 160 On remand, the D.C. Circuit first recounted the proceedings up to that point, noting that the "case has characteristics of a chameleon; it has changed its colorsand its shape-at each stage of the proceedings." 161 Turning to the remanded issues, the D.C. Circuit noted FERC's argument that, even though the auction rates were not "contract rates," FERC nevertheless possesses discretion to approve § 4.C of the Settlement Agreement. 162 However, the D.C. Circuit found that it could not determine whether FERC's position was reasonable under the Administrative Procedure Act because "FERC never articulated in its orders a rationale for its discretion to approve a Mobile-Sierra clause outside of the contract context, or an explanation for exercising that discretion here." 163 The court of appeals explained that "FERC must explain why, if the auction rates are not contract rates, they are entitled to Mobile-Sierra treatment," suggesting that FERC should clarify how "the auction rates reflect market conditions similar to freely-negotiated contract rates" or on what other ground FERC bases its asserted discretion. 164 The D.C. Circuit remanded FERC's orders approving the Settlement Agreement for further proceedings. As explained by FERC, the Mobile-Sierra presumption requires FERC to "presume that rates set by power sales contracts that are freely negotiated at arm's length between willing buyers and sellers meet the statutory 'just and reasonable' standard of review."
168 However, where the parties have not agreed to set rates by contract, Mobile-Sierra's public interest presumption does not automatically apply.
169
FERC found that the FCM auction rates were not "contract rates" that would 162 necessarily be subject to the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption when challenged. 170 In its order, FERC noted that the ICAP requirement is set by ISO-NE, not the purchasing entities.
171
FERC then described the FCM's auction mechanism and explained that once a price is determined-i.e., the "market clearing price"-the ISO-NE "assesses each utility a capacity charge equal to that utility's share of the installed capacity requirement multiplied by the market clearing price."
172 In a subsequent order responding to requests for rehearing, FERC stated that under this mechanism, the rates produced by the FCM auctions are "determined unilaterally by the ISO-NE tariff."
173 Further, because the auction applies to participants who did not agree to its adoption-that is, non-parties to the Settlement Agreement-FERC believed that the rates should not be considered "contract rates."
174
Turning to the second question on remand, FERC began by noting that the FPA does not directly address how the "just and reasonable" standard should be applied or implemented in any particular context. 175 As such, FERC believed that it "has discretion to consider and decide whether future challenges to rates should be evaluated under a more rigorous application of the statutory 'just and reasonable' standard of review."
176 FERC noted that it is not "bound to any one ratemaking formula," 177 and that nothing in the statute or case law precludes it from applying a standard like the "public interest" presumption when faced with challenges to rates other than contractually agreed-to rates, if relevant considerations make such application appropriate.
178
In the circumstances of Devon Power, FERC believed that it was proper to exercise its discretion and determined that it would apply a more rigorous application of the "just and reasonable" standard if the FCM auction rates were challenged in the future.
179
FERC stated that the application of the "public interest" presumption would provide for rate stability while satisfying the "just and reasonable" standard. 180 Because the rates resulting from the FCM auctions would share certain market-based characteristics with freely-negotiated contracts, FERC could presume that such rates would be just and reasonable.
181 Furthermore, the Settlement Agreement might not have been reached without the inclusion of the "public interest" presumption in § 4.C.
182
Finally, FERC stated that in other contexts it might be unjust and unreasonable to lock in a more stringent application of the "just and reasonable" standard, where there are not broader goals and purposes at issue (such as in Devon Power). 183 In each inquiry, FERC would focus on the particular facts presented. 184 In orders issued after the remand order in Devon Power, FERC has directed parties that have reached an uncontested settlement to modify their settlement agreements so as not to impose the "public interest" presumption on future challenges or changes proposed by FERC or non-settling parties. 185 In these cases, FERC found that the individual circumstances "did not rise to the compelling level of those present in Devon Power so as to warrant binding [FERC] and non-settling third parties to a more rigorous application of the statutory 'just and reasonable' standard of 179. Devon Power LLC, 134 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 2, 9, 17-20; Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 32-36. FERC also determined that it would implement the "more rigorous" application of the "just and reasonable" standard to any future challenges to the transition payments. IV. RESPONDING TO NRG'S REMANDED QUESTIONS As explained above in Part III, the Supreme Court found that neither the D.C. Circuit nor FERC had previously determined whether the FCM auction market clearing prices qualified as "contract rates" to which the Mobile-Sierra doctrine must apply. 189 The Court remanded that issue to the D.C. Circuit. 190 If the rates were not "contract rates," the D.C. Circuit was directed to resolve the additional issue of whether FERC possessed the discretion to apply the Mobile-Sierra presumption to such rates. 191 The D.C. Circuit, in turn, remanded these questions to FERC.
192 FERC determined that the FCM auction rates were not "contract rates." 193 Nonetheless, FERC believed that it "has discretion to consider and decide whether future challenges to rates should be evaluated under a more rigorous application of the statutory 'just and reasonable' standard of review."
194
FERC erred in its resolution of the first remanded question. FERC should have found that, for the 107 settling parties, the FCM auction rates are "contract rates" (in the Supreme Court's parlance) because, for those parties, the auction rates are the result of a negotiated settlement. Therefore, the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should apply automatically to challenges to the rates paid by any of the 107 settling parties. This article explores below the characteristics of socalled "contract rates," and suggests that it would be more accurate to describe a rate that is the result of successful negotiations and bargaining between the parties as a "bargained-for rate" ("BFR"). 195 The term "contract rate," particularly when 186 . HIOS, supra note 185, at P 525; Petal Gas, 135 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 17; So. LNG, 135 FERC ¶ 61,153 at P 24; Carolina Gas, supra note 185, at P 18; SCEG, supra note 185, at P 5; FP&L, supra note 185, at P 11; see also Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 36 (explaining cases).
187. distinguished from a "tariff rate," 196 fails to recognize that parties often negotiate and bargain for rates that are ultimately set forth in tariffs. This article also provides examples of FERC-regulated agreements and explains whether such agreements are BFRs to which the public interest presumption should automatically apply. Finally, this article answers the question remanded by the Supreme Court in NRG, explaining that for the 107 settling parties, the FCM auction produces BFRs to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should automatically apply.
With respect to the second remanded question-whether FERC possesses discretion to apply a "more rigorous" application of the just and reasonable standard-this article suggests that FERC should not have determined in advance that it would apply a more rigorous application of the just and reasonable standard to future challenges of the auction rates paid by the eight non-settling participants.
A. Determining Whether the Mobile-Sierra Public Interest Presumption Should Apply Automatically
Public utilities under the FPA may either (1) "fix by contract, and change only by mutual agreement, the rate agreed upon with a particular customer"; 197 or (2) unilaterally establish, and change at will, rates offered to prospective customers.
198
The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption automatically applies to challenges to the first set of agreements-which the Supreme Court in recent cases has referred to as "contract rates." However, the public interest presumption does not (automatically) apply to the second set of agreements, which the Court has referred to as "tariff rates." 199 Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, FERC "must presume that the rate set out in a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the 'just and reasonable' requirement" imposed by the FPA. 200 The principal rationale for applying the presumption is that the parties who negotiated the rate are generally "sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a 'just and reasonable' rate as between the two of them." 201 The hallmark of these agreements-which this article shall refer to as "BFRs"-is that the agreement contains a rate which was the result of successful negotiation and bargaining between the parties. Thus, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine recognizes the importance of individual agreements containing BFRs and that the FPA's regulatory scheme "contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in circumstances of unequivocal public necessity." 202 196. In both NRG and Morgan Stanley, the Supreme Court drew distinctions between "contract rates"-to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption automatically applies-and "tariff rates. However, the other category of rates under the FPA's regulatory scheme are subject to a public utility's right to unilaterally establish, and change at will, its rates offered to prospective customers; 203 in other words, unilateral rates. The Mobile-Sierra presumption does not (automatically) apply to such agreements. The Court described unilateral rate setting in a telecommunications case, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, stating that under "the classic scheme of administrative rate setting at the federal level," the "regulated utility companies [would set out their rates] in proposed tariff schedules," such as those employed under the ICA. 204 Interested parties would have an opportunity to comment, and the tariffs would be accepted by the regulatory agency so long as the rates contained therein were reasonable and not unduly discriminatory. 205 The Court recognized the use of such tariffs of general applicability for the natural gas industry in Memphis 206 and for the electric power industry (with respect to the transmission of electric power) in New York v. FERC. 207 Under the tariff-andservice agreement system, public utilities and natural gas pipelines adopt, subject to FERC approval, system-wide tariffs that establish the rates, terms, and conditions pursuant to which the utility company offers service to its customers, as those rates, terms, and conditions may be changed by the public utility or pipeline from time to time. 208 Customers execute "service agreements" with public utilities or natural gas pipelines containing (or incorporating by reference) standardized language for terms and conditions of service and references to FERC-approved rates set forth in the tariff's rate schedules of general applicability. 209 When such agreements are challenged at FERC, or when a party proposes to change a rate unilaterally, FERC must perform its review without applying the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption. 210 Thus, there are two types of regulated electric power agreements: (1) agreements that contain BFRs, established by mutual agreement of the parties, and therefore, to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption automatically applies; and (2) agreements that contain rates established unilaterally by a public 203. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 343 (1956) . 204. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 478. In Mobile, the Court noted that the ICA required all rates to be the same for all shippers (customers) and that there was no provision under the ICA for the filing of individual contracts. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 345. However, the NGA and FPA recognize the need for private contracts that contain various rates, terms, and conditions, and provide for the filing of such contracts. Id utility, often arising under the tariff-and-service-agreement method. The public interest presumption does not (automatically) apply to such agreements.
The Supreme Court has classified these two types of agreements as (1) "contract rates," and (2) "tariff rates."
211
At first blush, this appears to be convenient shorthand; however, the Court's terminology fails to recognize that the distinction between "contracts" and "tariffs" is not as clear as it once may have been. 212 The term "tariff rate"-as distinguished from a "contract rate"-implies that any agreement that results from the tariff-and-service-agreement system cannot be the result of negotiation and bargaining and, therefore, cannot be automatically subject to the Mobile-Sierra presumption. Similarly, the use of the term "contract rate" suggests that the public interest presumption cannot automatically apply to agreements other than traditional bilateral agreements.
This article explains below that the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should automatically apply to many agreements that include rates contained in tariffs. Rates set forth in tariffs may, in fact, be the result of bargaining and negotiation between a public utility and its customers, particularly in the case of settlement agreements. Therefore, the public interest presumption should apply when these rates are challenged. Instead of "contract rates" and "tariff rates," this article refers to BFRs and unilateral rates. These terms more accurately describe the characteristics of the rates, and recognize that the rates set forth in tariffs frequently are BFRs to which the public interest presumption should automatically apply.
B. BFRs vs. Unilateral Rates: Examples and Explanations
The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption applies to FERC-jurisdictional agreements and rates that are the result of negotiation and bargaining between the parties, but the presumption does not apply to rates that are set unilaterally. This section provides examples that illustrate the difference between the two. The first examples discussed below are the most straight-forward: bilateral fixed-rate contracts and tariffs, classic examples of BFRs and unilateral rates, respectively. The next example is that of unilateral rates set forth in bilateral agreements. Finally, this section discusses unilateral rates that result in negotiated settlements.
Classic Bargained-For Rates (BFRs): Bilateral Fixed-Rate Contracts
The classic example of an agreement containing a BFR is a bilateral fixed-rate agreement between a utility company (seller) and its customer (buyer). Both Mobile and Sierra involved bilateral fixed-rate agreements containing BFRs. 213 In each case, the seller attempted to change the BFR set forth in its existing bilateral contract. In Mobile, United Gas Pipe Line Company ("United") entered into an agreement to supply gas to Mobile Gas Service Corporation ("Mobile") for a duration of ten years at a rate that was the equivalent of 10.7 cents per MCF (thousand cubic feet). 214 However, prior to the expiration of that agreement, "United, without the consent of Mobile, filed new schedules with [FERC] , which purported to increase the rate on gas to . . . 14.5 cents per MCF." 215 Similarly, in Sierra, Sierra Pacific Power Company ("Sierra") had entered into an agreement to purchase electric power from Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E") for a duration of fifteen years. 216 However, prior to the expiration of the agreement, "PG&E, without the consent of Sierra, filed with [FERC] . . . a schedule purporting to increase its rate to Sierra by approximately 28%." 217 In both cases, the agreements at issue contained BFRs. United and Mobile, and PG&E and Sierra, respectively, 218 negotiated and entered into agreements where the rate was the result of arms-length bargaining. These agreements were traditional bilateral contracts and could not be changed without the consent of both parties.
219
Because the agreements contained BFRs, the public interest presumption applied, and neither United nor PG&E was permitted to unilaterally change the BFRs in the agreements. 220 In neither case did the Court find that the public interest required the rates to be reformed. 
Classic Unilateral Rates: Tariffs
Other agreements contain unilateral rates.
As the Supreme Court's terminology suggests, the classic example of a unilateral rate is set forth in a tariff of general applicability. As discussed above, the use of tariffs for federallyregulated rates originated under the ICA.
222
In Memphis, the Supreme Court recognized that FERC had directed natural gas pipelines to adopt tariffs for natural gas transmission. 223 As part of the Order No. 888 series, initially issued in 1996, FERC required electric utilities to provide open access transmission service pursuant to a standardized, or "pro forma," tariff, which was set forth in Appendix A tariff does not, on its own, constitute an agreement between the service provider and any customer. Customers must execute "service agreements" containing references to rates set forth in the tariff's rate schedules and incorporating the tariff's general terms and conditions. 225 Under a classic tariff scheme, customers do not negotiate with the utility the rates for service. Instead, the customer must accept the rates set forth in the tariff. The customer is protected because the regulatory agency, such as FERC, has found that the rates listed in the tariff are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory. Tariff rates generally constitute a utility's "going rates."
226 When the utility determines that the rates in the tariff no longer provide it with a sufficient return, the utility may unilaterally seek an increase by proposing a new rate to FERC. 227 The rate goes into effect automatically so long as FERC does not find that the rate is not just and reasonable. 228 Because the tariffs apply to all of the utility's customers and tariffs are not limited to a specific duration, a utility must retain the right to change its rates when it requires a greater return. FERC has recognized as much. In Order No. 888, FERC's pro forma tariff for electric transmission service provides that the electric transmission provider retains the right to unilaterally propose rate changes and file those proposed rate changes with FERC pursuant to FPA section 205. 
Unilateral Rates in Bilateral Agreements
Tariffs are not the only contractual instruments through which a unilateral rate may be established. Changes to a bilateral agreement ordinarily must be agreed to by both parties; 230 but the FPA's regulatory scheme permits parties to include in 224. Order No. 888, supra note 95, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,706-24. As opposed to natural gas pipelines, which were permitted to propose their own individual tariffs, FERC-regulated public utilities providing transmission service were required to adopt the pro forma tariff. Utilities were permitted to propose deviations from the pro forma tariff if those individual changes could be shown to be consistent with, or superior to, the pro forma tariff. their bilateral agreements a provision that would permit one or both parties to unilaterally establish a new rate that would supersede the existing contract ratei.e., a Memphis clause, in essence permitting the parties to "contract out of the Mobile-Sierra presumption." 231 The new rate would be subject to FPA section 205(d)'s requirement that it be filed with FERC but can take effect without FERC action.
232
Two courts of appeals have identified another route by which two parties to a bilateral agreement can effectuate a rate change. 233 Parties may include in their contracts a provision that would permit FERC to act pursuant to FPA section 206(a) and set aside the existing rate if the rate is found not to be just and reasonable and replace it with a new rate. 234 Such a provision is different from a Memphis clause, which permits the seller to take unilateral action to increase rates, subject only to FPA section 205's filing requirements. 235 Such rate changes are effected solely by virtue of the utility's action and do not require a FERC order.
236
Unlike a Memphis clause, a provision permitting rate changes pursuant to FPA section 206 requires FERC action to permit any proposed rate changes. 237 When the contract requires a FERC order, the parties "have bargained for and obtained a contractual authorization for a section 206(a) proceeding with its just and reasonable standard of proof." 238 The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption would not apply in this context because the parties contemplated that they would be permitted to seek rate changes. 239 Because the rate change would be implemented pursuant to FPA section 206(a), the rate would only apply prospectively from the date of the FERC order.
240
Thus, the courts recognize that the entities regulated by FERC have established several options through which to contractually provide for changes to rates in existing bilateral agreements. "The rule of Sierra, Mobile and Memphis is refreshingly simple: The contract between the parties governs the legality of the filing. Rate filings consistent with contractual obligations are valid; rate filings inconsistent with contractual obligations are invalid." 
Unilateral Rate Setting that Results in a Settlement: A Mixed Case
Utilities' tariffs generally include Memphis clauses, permitting the utilities to unilaterally change rates set forth in the tariffs. Similarly, if a bilateral agreement contains a Memphis clause, the utility may make a unilateral change to a rate set forth in that contract. In both cases, the utility must comply with the notice provisions of FPA section 205(d).
242
The prevalence of unilateral rate setting has caused FERC and utility practice with respect to FPA section 205 to evolve over time. The Supreme Court in Mobile characterized the FPA as not establishing a rate-changing procedure or a mechanism for initiating rate "proceedings."
243 FPA section 205 provides only for notice to FERC of the rates established by the public utility and for review by FERC of those rates.
244 Notwithstanding Mobile's straightforward analysis of FPA section 205, that section's notice requirement and opportunity for review by FERC have become similar to the "traditional" unilateral rate-setting model, 245 where public utilities "seek approval" from FERC in order to implement a proposed rate. 246 FPA section 205 has been described as "the key pattern for much of be "to assume that it was intended to be virtually inoperative; whereas to interpret it as referring" to the just and reasonable standard without the application of the presumption "is to give it a content that is both substantial and fair to both sides."). When a utility's unilateral rate filing is contested by interested parties, FERC will frequently give the utility and the parties the opportunity to come to an agreement, or settlement, resolving differences in their positions. This article explains that when the utility and interested parties reach a settlement, through negotiation and bargaining, the rate they establish is a BFR. FERC's rate filing procedures and settlement practice are summarized below. This article argues that because settlements are the result of negotiation and bargaining, the public interest presumption should automatically apply when a settlement is challenged. An example of a unilateral rate filing resulting in a settlement is provided below, including an explanation of when and how the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption would apply. FERC's regulations require that the utility include the rationale and support for the increase, and to enable FERC and its staff to evaluate the merits of the "proposed" rate. 254 A utility may need to file up to thirty-eight different cost-of-service statements.
a. FERC's Rate Filing Procedures
255
After the utility makes its initial rate case filing, FERC will assign a new 295 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002) . In Atlantic City Elec. Co., the court characterized FPA section 205's filing requirement as a statutory right to file changes to rates given to public utilities by Congress. Id. This characterization stands in stark contrast to Mobile's pronouncement that section 205 bestowed no rights on utilities, but merely required utilities to provide notice of any rate change that they are permitted under their agreements to make. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 339-40, 341-42. 247. MCGREW, supra note 25, at 21. Id. at § 35.13(h) (setting forth Statements AA through BM) (note that there is no Statement AZ). These Statements seek information relating to, among other things, earnings, labor, materials, operation and maintenance expenses, taxes, fuel, depreciation on plant, construction, interest costs for debt, and other costs. Not all thirty-eight Statements will be appropriate for each rate case. docket number to that filing and issue a "notice of filing." 256 In the notice of filing, FERC will establish a deadline-usually twenty-one days after the date of filingfor interested parties to submit protests and motions to intervene in the docketed proceeding.
257 Through protests, interested parties, such as customers or state commissions, may set forth their objections to the rate change proposed by the utility. If no party protests a proposed rate change, FERC is more likely to permit the proposed change to become effective on the proposed effective date. 258 This practice is consistent with the traditional understanding of FPA section 205 expressed in Mobile, that section 205 is not a rate-change mechanism, but that otherwise valid rate changes can go into effect so long as the proponent provides the required notice to FERC and FERC has the opportunity to review the changed rate.
259
Although FERC may reject a filing "which patently fails to substantially comply" with FERC's Part 35 requirements, 260 FERC generally will issue an order permitting the proposed rate to become effective on the date requested, or suspending the filing (for up to five months) and permitting it to become effective subject to refund. 261 The purpose of a suspension is to allow FERC to resolve issues of fact and to determine whether the proposed rate is just and reasonable, or what a just and reasonable rate would be. 262 If the proposed rate is suspended, it is generally set for hearing-a trial-type proceeding-before an ALJ. Rejection of a filing is appropriate "where the filing is so deficient on its face that the agency may properly return it to the filing party without even awaiting a responsive filing by any other party in interest." Id. at 1346.
261. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 32. Where FERC's preliminary analysis indicates that the proposed rates may be unjust and unreasonable, and may be substantially excessive, FERC will generally impose a five-month suspension under FPA section 205. See W. Tex. Utils. Co., 18 FERC ¶ 61,189 (1982) . If a rate is permitted to become effective "subject to refund," the utility is permitted to collect the proposed rate while the hearing takes place. Id. When the hearing is concluded, and FERC has determined a just and reasonable rate, the utility must refund the difference between the rate that was collected and the just and reasonable rate. Id.
262. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824d(e) (2010 & Supp. 2012). In such situations, FERC typically will find that aspects of the proposed rate change cannot be resolved based on the record before it-i.e., the materials submitted by the proponent of the rate change and any protests thereto-and are more appropriately addressed in a hearing before an ALJ. See, e.g., PacifiCorp, 137 FERC ¶ 61,247 at P 18 (Dec. 30, 2011).
263. See MCGREW, supra note 25, at 32, 183.
voluminous case load. 264 Because FERC hearings can be time consuming and expensive, parties often resolve the issues set for hearing by settlement.
265 FERC and the courts have determined that settlements are in the public interest because they provide for "voluntary, self-imposed resolutions" of issues that have been set for hearing.
266
In dockets where FERC has set issues for hearing, it is common practice for FERC to hold the hearing in abeyance and direct the parties to engage in settlement discussions aided by the appointment of a settlement judge.
267
Parties may submit an offer of settlement at any time, 268 but settlements must be submitted to and approved by FERC in order to take effect. After an offer of settlement is submitted to FERC, all participants in the docketed proceeding have the opportunity to file comments and reply comments on the settlement offer.
269
Given the inherent nature of compromise involved in a settlement, a settlement offer may be considered a "black box" in which the settling parties agree to settle the case without specifying a rate of return.
270
If the offer of settlement is uncontested, FERC will approve the settlement if it is fair and reasonable and in the public interest. 271 Generally, if the settlement is uncontested, there are few procedural obstacles in the path to FERC approval.
272
Settlements are reached through negotiation and bargaining, and the customers who join the settlement have agreed to the rate set forth in the settlement agreement. 273 As such, the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption applies to 264. See Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 306 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir. 1962). FERC relies on its informal settlement procedure to resolve most of its rate cases. See, e.g., Littlechild, supra note 9, at 2, 32. Professor Littlechild provides a detailed account of how the settlement process at FERC operates in practice with respect to natural gas pipeline rate cases. Another article has used a theoretical model and empirical data from natural gas cases to examine three issues: (1) how the settlement process is different from the formal adjudicatory process; (2) how settlement outcomes are different from outcomes in litigation; and (3) why participants settle rate cases. Cir. 1984 ) (characterizing approval of a settlement "allowing [the settling parties] to have the benefit of their bargain"); see also Littlechild, supra note 9, at 17-19 (describing the settlement procedure as a negotiation process), 32 (stating that FERC's "regulatory aim is to bring the parties into agreement, not to impose a preconceived settlement upon them" and "to facilitate the market process, not to replace it"); Wang, supra note 264, at 156, 161 (explaining that "[t]he settlement process is clearly a bargaining game" and that consenting parties to a settlement may "reap the benefits of their bargain"). Cf. McCaffrey, supra note 98, at 78-80 (noting that it can be argued that FERC should not "reject a settlement agreement negotiated by sophisticated parties to govern jurisdictional rates, terms and conditions").
issues that are resolved through settlement. 274 As discussed above in Part II, bargaining between parties is the hallmark of rates to which the public interest presumption must apply. Although proceedings to change rates may have commenced through a unilateral filing by a utility, the resolution through settlement transforms the unilateral rate "proposal" into a BFR. 275 Settlements need not be unanimous and may be contested by participants of the proceeding. 276 If the offer of settlement is contested, FERC may decide the merits of the contested issues if it determines that the record is adequately developed to do so. 277 If the record is not adequate to make a determination on the 275. It has been suggested that "negotiated settlements have generally led to better information flows and understanding in the industry, and to better relationships between the company and customers." Littlechild, supra note 9, at 24.
276. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h). A key difference between settlements in administrative proceedings and those in civil litigation is that a settlement "do[es] not have to be consented to by all parties to the [administrative] proceeding, and if settlements are found to be 'equitable by the regulatory agency, then the terms of the settlement form the substance of an order binding on all parties, even though not all are in accord as to the result.'" Mary Ann Walker, Settlement Practice at the FERC: Boom or Bane, 7 ENERGY L. J. 343, 344 (1986) REG. 337 (1996) (arguing that requiring unanimous settlements is neither necessary nor conducive to reasonable regulation). Other observers suggest that contested, or non-unanimous, settlements are abnormal, and that the uncertainty about the outcome and the cost and burden of carrying a case alone may make contested settlements unattractive to objecting parties. See Littlechild, supra note 9, at 19.
277. 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h); see Pa. Gas & Water Co., 463 F.2d at 1247-52 (finding that FERC may approve a non-unanimous rate settlement proposal and terminate proceedings over the objection of a participant in the proceeding). In Trailblazer Pipeline Co., 85 FERC ¶ 61,345 (1998), order on reh'g, 87 FERC ¶ 61,110 (1999), FERC explained the standards it would use to rule on contested offers of settlement. If FERC concludes that a contested settlement provides an acceptable outcome for a case, it must next determine which of four approaches it will employ to address each of the contested issues on the merits: (1) FERC shall render a binding merits decision on each contested issue; (2) FERC shall approve the settlement based on a finding that the overall settlement as a package is just and reasonable; (3) FERC shall determine that the benefits of the settlement outweigh the nature of the objections, and the interests of the contesting party are too attenuated; or (4) FERC shall approve the settlement as merits of a contested issue, FERC may provide for a limited hearing to supplement the record so that FERC may make such findings on the merits. 278 FERC may choose to sever contested issues or contesting parties, approving the uncontested portion of the settlement or approving the settlement as between consenting parties, if it finds it appropriate to do so. 279 However, most offers of settlement contain "non-severability" clauses, which require that the offer of settlement be approved as a package and that issues may not be severed.
280
A settlement may be reached among all or some of the participants to the proceeding and may resolve all or some of the issues between the parties. FERC may impose aspects of a non-unanimous settlement on participants that contested the settlement.
281
The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should apply when an issue resolved by the settlement is challenged, 282 but not when an aspect of the settlement that was imposed on a contesting participant is challenged. This may be administratively inconvenient-where the public interest presumption would apply to a challenge to rates paid by settlement parties, but would not apply to a challenge to identical rates paid by a contesting participant. However, it recognizes that the parties to a settlement successfully negotiated and agreed to the rates and issues set forth in the settlement agreement, but that a participant contesting part (or all) of a settlement did not. It is also consistent with FERC's practice of severing contesting parties in order to effectuate a settlement among the consenting parties. 283 Courts of appeals have approved this practice, even though it results in participants to the same proceeding paying different rates. 284 Where a rate proceeding may result in participants paying different rates (because FERC may approve a settlement for parties consenting to the settlement agreement, but contesting participants would pay an administratively determined rate), it follows uncontested for the consenting parties, and sever the contesting parties to allow them to litigate the issues raised. Id.
278 101 (1983) , to approve a settlement as to all parties except the contesting party and to direct a full evidentiary hearing on the question of the contesting party's rates). Cf. Wang, supra note 264, at 161 (concluding that FERC's policy of approving a settlement as uncontested for consenting parties and severing contesting parties to litigate a rate case is more practical than adopting a unanimity requirement).
280. that there may be differing applications of the just and reasonable standard when rates established through a settlement are challenged. This is because the MobileSierra public interest presumption would apply when rates paid by settling parties are challenged, but not when the rates paid by participants on whom the settlement rates were imposed by FERC are challenged.
c. Examples
Some examples may help to illustrate these principles. Suppose that Utility Co. has an electric tariff on file with FERC. The tariff contains three rate schedules for different electric services: Rates Schedules A, B, and C. Utility Co.'s tariff includes a Memphis clause, permitting Utility Co. to make unilateral rate changes to the rates set forth in Rate Schedules A, B, and C. Utility Co. does so, and submits the proposed rates to FERC on January 2, 2011, requesting an effective date of March 3, 2011-sixty days later. After FERC issues a notice of filing, wholesale customers of Utility Co.-W, X, and Y-file motions to intervene and protests to the proposed rate increases.
285 Z, a retail customer of W, also files a motion to intervene and protest. State Utility Commission intervenes and protests as well. FERC issues an order accepting the rates subject to refund, but suspending the effectiveness of the proposed rates for five months-until August 3, 2011-and instituting hearing procedures to investigate the justness and reasonableness of the proposed changes to the rates. However, FERC holds the hearing in abeyance and directs the parties to engage in settlement discussions.
After months of negotiations and bargaining, Utility Co. submits an offer of settlement to FERC with respect to Rate Schedules A and B. For Rate Schedule A, all parties-Utility Co., W, X, Y, Z, and State Utility Commission-have compromised and agreed to a smaller increase in the rate than proposed by Utility Co. For Rate Schedule B, Utility Co. has reached an agreement with W, X, and Z for a smaller rate increase than that originally proposed; however, Y and State Utility Commission object to the amount of the increase and do not join the settlement agreement with respect to Rate Schedule B. The settlement agreement stipulates that Utility Co. will not seek a rate increase with respect to Rate Schedules A and B for a period of five years after the effectiveness of the settlement rates 286 -that is, August 3, 2016. However, Utility Co. will be permitted to unilaterally seek a rate increase that may take effect no earlier than August 3, 2016. In addition, the settlement agreement states that the Mobile-Sierra presumption shall apply to any challenges to, or attempts to change, the rates for Rate Schedules A and B during the five year rate moratorium. Finally, no agreement is reached with respect to Rate Schedule C.
After the offer of settlement is presented to FERC, 287 FERC issues an order 285 . Each of W, X, and Y have executed individual service agreements under Utility Co.'s tariff. 286. One commenter has observed that "[i]t is remarkable that rate moratorium, a simple form of price cap regulation, arises endogenously from the settlement process of the traditional" rate cases. Wang, supra note 264, at 142. Although FERC is prohibited by the FPA and NGA from imposing a rate moratorium on the regulated utilities and pipelines, it "is free and willing to approve settlements with rate moratoria." Id.
287. When settlement discussions are before an ALJ, FERC's Rules of Practice and Procedure call for the ALJ to certify an offer of settlement to FERC. If, after comments are submitted on the offer of finding that the rates for Rate Schedules A and B are fair and reasonable and in the public interest, notwithstanding the objections by Y and State Utility Commission with respect to Rate Schedule B.
288 Therefore, the rates set forth in the settlement agreement for Rate Schedules A and B take effect on the date contemplated by the five-month suspension-that is, August 3, 2011. FERC sets Rate Schedule C for hearing, and the parties proceed with trial-type hearing procedures before an ALJ to determine a just and reasonable rate. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ determines that a rate increase is appropriate, but that the increase should be smaller than that proposed by Utility Co. 289 In a subsequent order, FERC approves of the ALJ's findings, and the new rate for Rate Schedule C goes into effect on August 3, 2011.
Suppose further that in July 2013, Utility Co. decides to seek a higher rate for services provided under Rate Schedule A and submits a proposed rate increase to FERC on July 15, 2013. FERC issues an order finding that Utility Co.'s rate filing is a legal nullity. 290 The rate for Rate Schedule A constitutes a BFR, agreed to in the settlement by Utility Co. and all interested parties.
291 Therefore, Utility Co. and the parties only possess the rights that are enumerated in the settlement agreement with respect to Rate Schedule A.
292 Utility Co.'s July 15 filing is similar to the proposed rate increase in Mobile, because Utility Co. does not have authority under the settlement agreement to unilaterally change the rate until August 3, 2016.
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Because the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption applies to Utility Co.'s proposed rate change, FERC may only permit the rate to be changed (prior to settlement, the ALJ determines that the settlement is uncontested, the ALJ shall certify to FERC that the offer of settlement is uncontested. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(g)(1). An uncontested offer of settlement may be approved by FERC upon a finding that the settlement appears to be fair and reasonable and in the public interest. See id. § 385.602(g)(3). If the ALJ determines that the offer of settlement is contested, either in whole or in part, the ALJ may certify all or part of the offer to FERC. See id. § 385.602(h)(2). If any part of the settlement is contested, it may be certified to FERC only if: (1) there are no genuine issues of material fact; or (2) the parties concur that the ALJ may omit preparation of an initial decision, and the record contains substantial evidence from which FERC may reach a reasoned decision on the merits of the contested issue. See id.
288. See Pennsylvania. Gas & Water Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d 1242, 1247-52 (D.C. Cir. 1972 ) (finding that FERC may approve a rate settlement proposal and terminate proceedings over the objection of a participant in the proceeding, so long as there are no questions of material fact). In this situation, the ALJ could have certified as uncontested the offer of settlement as it relates to the rates in Rate Schedule A, severed from the contested offer of settlement with respect to Rate Schedule B. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h)(2)(iv).
289. Subject to certain exceptions, at the conclusion of a hearing the ALJ who presides over the hearing shall prepare a written initial decision, which shall be certified to FERC with a copy of the record from the hearing. Suppose that the following year, X and Y file complaints at FERC against Utility Co., alleging that the rates in Rate Schedule B are excessive. State Utility Commission believes that the rates paid by W under Rate Schedule B, some of which are passed on in retail rates to W's retail customer Z, are too high, resulting in excessive retail rates collected by W from Z. State Utility Commission also files a complaint with FERC against Utility Co., arguing that W is paying too much under Rate Schedule B. FERC consolidates all of these complaint proceedings because all complainants are challenging the rates in Rate Schedule B. In the consolidated proceedings, FERC must first determine whether the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption automatically applies.
The public interest presumption must apply to the challenge made by X because X's rate is a BFR. The rate paid by X to Utility Co. is a BFR because Utility Co. and X agreed to that rate in the settlement agreement; therefore, FERC must apply the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption to the challenge by X.
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Although the public interest presumption must apply to the challenge made by X, that is not the case with respect to the challenge made by Y. Y did not agree to the rate set forth in the settlement agreement for Rate Schedule B. Therefore, the rate paid by Y cannot be considered a BFR (even though it is the same rate paid by X). Because Y's rate is not a BFR, FERC would not automatically apply the public interest presumption to the challenge made by Y.
There may appear to be a conundrum: both X and Y pay the same rate under Rate Schedule B, yet X's rate is a BFR and Y's rate is not. However, this outcome is consistent with the principles underlying the Mobile-Sierra presumptionnamely, that parties who have negotiated and agreed to a rate are bound to it. A BFR is established when both parties mutually agree to the rate, as when X and Utility Co. joined the settlement agreement, 297 and X bargained away the right to challenge its rate under Rate Schedule B prior to August 3, 2016. However, Y struck no such bargain and should not be bound by a contract term to which it did not agree. This may be administratively inconvenient for FERC, but it recognizes that each of a utility company's customers, including customers taking service pursuant to a tariff, have separate contractual agreements with the utility. 299 In this example, the Mobile-Sierra presumption would apply to State Utility Commission's challenge of W's rate because W was a party to the settlement agreement. 300 Therefore, under NRG, FERC and State Utility Commission must presume that W's rate is just and reasonable because W's rate is the result of negotiations that ended in settlement. 301 
C. Addressing NRG's Issues on Remand
On remand, FERC was directed to determine whether the FCM auction market clearing prices should be considered "contract rates" (or BFRs) to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption must apply. 302 And, if not, FERC was also directed to answer whether it possesses the discretion to apply the MobileSierra presumption to such rates. 303 FERC determined that the rates were not BFRs. 304 Nonetheless, FERC believed that it "has discretion to consider and decide whether future challenges to rates should be evaluated under a more rigorous application of the statutory 'just and reasonable' standard of review." 305 FERC's finding as to the first question was in error. The FCM auction produces BFRs. A BFR results from freely negotiated contracts, 306 including settlement agreements. 307 The ISO-NE's FCM is a unique creation that does not fit squarely within the traditional seller-purchaser contractual rubric. However, the principles outlined above can be used to determine the appropriate resolution to the Supreme Court's questions in NRG.
The FCM auction mechanism was set forth in the Settlement Agreement, which was agreed to by 107 of 115 participants in the Devon Power proceeding. 308 The Settlement Agreement was reached through painstaking negotiation and bargaining, and the settling parties agreed to the use of the auction mechanism to determine the price for capacity. 309 The results of the annual auctions are akin to the prices produced through the application of "formula rates." With a formula rate, "the formula itself is the rate." 310 As a utility's costs fluctuate over time, the costs can be plugged in to the formula to derive the resulting rate charged to customers. When FERC approves a formula rate, it is approving the formula, not the utility's inputs into the formula or the charges resulting from the application of the inputs into the formula. 311 One court of appeals has stated that a formula rate in a bilateral contract functions in many respects as a cost-of-service tariff. Rather than specifying a rate, it elucidates a formula for calculating a rate. The formula uses cost variables, or categories of costs, to measure most components . . . . As the utility's costs in each of these categories fluctuate, its charges vary proportionately, without the need for a rate change filing [pursuant to FPA section 205]. 312 As with a traditional formula rate, the Settlement Agreement in Devon Power and the ISO-NE tariff did not state what the auction clearing prices would be; rather, the Settlement Agreement established the FCM, under which the ISO-NE holds annual price-setting auctions for capacity. 313 The individual auction processes provide the inputs to the "formula" that result in the market clearing prices, i.e., the rates. Just as with formula rates, approval by FERC of the Settlement Agreement permitted the auction mechanism to go into effect.
The auction mechanism was established through a settlement that was reached by 107 parties in Devon Power. 314 As such, the FCM's auction process and the prices it produces constitute BFRs for those 107 parties. 315 The Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should apply to challenges to capacity prices derived from FCM auctions paid by the 107 settling parties. 316 With respect to the rates paid by the eight parties that did not join the settlement in Devon Power (if they are electric utilities that need to acquire capacity), the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption would not (automatically) apply to challenges to their rates. Purchasers that did not join the Settlement Agreement must pay a price for capacity that was not the result of those purchasers' negotiations and assent. Therefore, the FCM auction mechanism and the resulting prices are not BFRs with respect to those purchasers.
It should be noted that if the challenger is not a capacity purchaser-for example, a state utility commission-the challenge is, inherently, to the price paid by some purchaser for capacity. As NRG made clear, application of the presumption does not depend on the identity of the challenger. 317 Rather, the inquiry turns on the nature of the agreement challenged. If a state utility commission challenges the price for capacity paid by a purchaser who was a party to the Settlement Agreement, then FERC should presume that the purchaser's rate was just and reasonable because the rate and the auction mechanism that led to the rate were the result of fair negotiations and voluntary agreement. 318 If the challenge is to a price paid by a purchaser that was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, the public interest presumption would not automatically apply.
FERC's orders on remand did not consider that the Settlement Agreement imbues the auction rates with the characteristics of BFRs. Instead, FERC focused on the FCM auction itself, finding that it produced rates that are "determined unilaterally by the ISO-NE tariff" because the ISO-NE assesses the purchasing utilities their respective capacity charges based on the FCM auction's market clearing prices. 319 FERC ignored the role of the settling parties in establishing the FCM. Although the ISO-NE's role in assessing capacity charges is set forth in the ISO-NE's tariff, it does not necessarily follow that the capacity charges constitute unilateral rates. When a utility offers services under a traditional tariff, the utility assesses charges to its customers. However, as explained above, not every rate set forth in a tariff is a unilateral rate. When a rate is the result of a successful settlement-that is, negotiation, bargaining, and mutual agreement-the rate is a BFR. 320 In Devon Power, 107 parties agreed to the FCM and its auction mechanism. 321 Therefore, the capacity charges that result from the FCM's auction paid by those 107 parties are BFRs. 322 In the order addressing requests for rehearing, FERC noted that "ISO-NE's tariff does not create a contractual obligation by buyers to purchase capacity from sellers of that capacity." 323 This does not mean that the capacity charges are unilateral rates. With an ordinary tariff, the existence of the tariff does not obligate any entity to become a customer of the utility or to take particular services or purchase particular quantities. However, if a customer purchases a product or service offered through a tariff, the customer is obligated to pay the price set forth in the tariff. Here, utilities in New England must procure certain quantities of capacity. 324 If the utilities do not self-supply the capacity or procure it from another source, they must purchase capacity through the FCM. 325 Although the auctions do not create an obligation for the utilities to purchase, the auctions set the prices for utilities purchasing capacity through the FCM. If the utilities purchase capacity through the FCM, they are obligated to pay the price set through the auction process, just as a customer under a traditional tariff is obligated to pay the rate set forth in the tariff or the rate derived through a formula set forth in the tariff. Whether the rates are BFRs turns on whether the rate was the result of purely unilateral rate setting or through negotiations and bargaining.
Turning to the second question on remand, FERC was directed to answer, if the FCM auction rates were not BFRs, whether FERC "ha[s] discretion to treat them analogously" to BFRs.
326 FERC stated that it "has discretion to consider and decide whether future challenges to rates should be evaluated under a more rigorous application of the statutory 'just and reasonable' standard of review" and that future challenges to the FCM's auction prices would be subject to a "more rigorous application." 327 In reaching this decision, FERC relied on the fact that the rates resulting from the FCM auctions would have certain market-based characteristics, similar to freely-negotiated contracts to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption must apply. 328 FERC also noted that a more rigorous application of the just and reasonable standard would promote rate stability, an important issue because of the variable nature of capacity revenues and the effect of that instability on generating units in New England. 329 It should first be noted that, had FERC answered the first remanded question properly, it would not have needed to address the second remanded question with respect to the rates paid by the 107 parties to the Settlement Agreement because challenges to those rates should be automatically subject to the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption. However, the question remains whether a more stringent application of the just and reasonable standard-such as the public interest presumption-can and should be applied to challenges to the rates paid by non-settling parties.
FERC's affirmative answer may be considered both incorrect and premature.
FERC was incorrect insofar as it purported to determine that a more rigorous application of the just and reasonable standard will automatically apply to future challenges to the rates paid by non-settling parties. 330 The automatic application of the Mobile-Sierra public interest standard to BFRs is appropriate because it respects the intent of the parties that negotiated the agreement. 331 However, where the challenged rate is not a BFR, as would be the case for rates paid by the nonsettling parties in Devon Power, the rationale underlying the application of the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption does not apply. 332 In Devon Power, the non-settling participants did not agree to the FCM auction, and did not agree to the application of the public interest presumption to challenges to their rates. In essence, FERC is attempting to bind the non-settling participants to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In this way, FERC's response to the Supreme Court's second remand question may be considered to be incorrect.
FERC's response is also premature because FERC should determine whether a "more rigorous" application of the just and reasonable standard should apply to a challenge of an FCM auction rate paid by a non-settling participant at the time such a challenge is brought. Although FERC is correct that the FPA does not directly address how the "just and reasonable" standard should be applied or implemented in any particular context, 333 FERC can better determine at the time the challenge is made whether a more rigorous application of the just and reasonable standard is appropriate. In the orders on remand, FERC has offered reasons why it believes that challenges to the FCM auction results should be subject to application of the public interest presumption, including challenges to rates paid by non-settling parties. 334 There may be situations in which it is appropriate for FERC to apply a presumption to challenges of rates that are not BFRs; however, an examination of the possible application of the public interest presumption outside of the BFR context is beyond the scope of this article. 335 Because the auction rates paid by non-settling participants are not BFRs and application of a presumption would not 330. See id. at P 17-25. It is not clear whether FERC considers the more rigorous application of the just and reasonable standard that would be applied in FERC's discretion to be Mobile-Sierra's "public interest" presumption, or a different (yet similar) application. One set of commenters believes that FERC has drawn distinctions between the public interest presumption and the new discretionary application. Cf. Tewksbury, Lim & Su, supra note 98, at 451-52.
331. FERC believed that the Settlement Agreement might not have been reached without the inclusion of the public interest presumption in section 4.C. Devon Power LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 35. This purported rationale should be inapposite because the FCM auction produces BFRs for the parties to the Settlement Agreement; as such, the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption would apply automatically to challenges, regardless of whether a Mobile-Sierra clause was included in the Settlement Agreement.
332 be based on the negotiations and bargaining of the parties, FERC should not have determined in advance whether a presumption shall apply to future challenges of those rates. In this regard, FERC's answer to the second remanded question may be considered premature.
V. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FERC'S ORDERS ON REMAND IN DEVON POWER LLC
It may at first appear that there is little practical difference between FERC's resolution of the issues remanded by the Supreme Court and the proposed resolution of those issues put forth by this article. In Devon Power, FERC found that even though the FCM auction rates were not BFRs (or "contract rates"), FERC could exercise its discretion to approve a settlement provision that would impose the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption on future challenges to the auction results. 336 On the other hand, this article has explained that, for the parties to the Settlement Agreement, the auction results are BFRs and the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should apply to challenges to the rates paid by the 107 settling parties; 337 however, the public interest presumption would not automatically apply to challenges to the rates paid by the eight participants that objected to the Settlement Agreement. Thus, with respect to the participants in the Devon Power proceeding, FERC and this article agree that the Mobile-Sierra presumption should apply to future challenges to the rates paid by the 107 parties to the Settlement Agreement. FERC has also determined in advance that it will apply the public interest presumption to future challenges to auction prices paid by the eight nonsettling parties, while this article suggests that any such determination should be made if and when such a challenge arises.
Notwithstanding the practical similarity between the outcome for the participants in Devon Power and the outcome that would arise following the analysis in this article, FERC's Devon Power precedent will have significant consequences on regulated utilities. The impact of FERC's determination will be felt most significantly in proceedings that are resolved through settlement. The Settlement Agreement in Devon Power resolved a unique situation. Routine changes to rates set forth in tariffs and bilateral agreements will arise more frequently than issues associated with the New England capacity market that was the subject of the controversy in Devon Power.
Since issuing its order on remand in Devon Power, FERC has addressed the inclusion of so-called "Mobile-Sierra clauses" in uncontested settlement agreements resolving proceedings to change rates set forth in tariffs several times. 338 In the post-Devon Power cases, FERC found that because the rates at standard to future challenges to the settlement brought by FERC or non-settling third parties. 345 This determination was error. The rate set forth in the settlement agreement in SCEG constitutes a BFR between SCEG and the four customers that joined the settlement agreement. If any entity challenges the rate paid by one of those four customers pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption should apply to that challenge, whether the challenge is brought by one of the four customers, FERC, or a non-party to the settlement. 346 As the Supreme Court explained in NRG, application of the Mobile-Sierra presumption does not depend upon the identity of the person challenging the rate at issue-i.e., whether the challenger is a party to contested agreement, or a thirdparty. 347 The situation created by FERC in SCEG and other proceedings is likely to be repeated in cases that are resolved through settlement agreements. The effects may be far-reaching because 80 to 90 percent of all rate proceedings set for hearing at FERC are resolved through settlement. 348 When FERC determines that a rate set forth in a settlement agreement is not a BFR to which the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption automatically applies, FERC will likely further determine that it and non-parties to the settlement are free to challenge the rate paid by settlement parties without presuming that the rates are just and reasonable. 349 Just as in SCEG, these findings will be contrary to the principle that rates set forth in settlement agreements are BFRs and the holding from NRG-namely, that application of the Mobile-Sierra presumption does not depend upon the identity of the person challenging the rate. 350 In these cases, the bargain struck by the parties to the settlement agreement will be subject to being overturned by challenges brought by FERC or non-parties to the settlement agreement. Furthermore, FERC may be forced to re-visit issues that should have been finalized by settlement agreements. This compromises the stability that is purported to be undergirded by the FPA's agreement-based regulatory regime.
It should be noted that if there were another customer under the tariff at issue in SCEG-a customer that was not a party to the settlement agreement-that thirdparty customer could challenge the rate it pays under its own service agreement with SCEG without application of the public interest presumption to that challenge. This inconvenient situation may arise where a rate set forth in a tariff may be subject to differing applications of the just and reasonable standard depending on which customer's rate is being challenged: a settlement party's rate, or a third party's rate. Although this is not the most convenient way for FERC or utilities to deal with challenges to rates, it respects the wishes of parties to settlement agreements, adheres to the principle of contract stability, and properly recognizes that settlement agreements should automatically be subject to the Mobile-Sierra presumption because they are the result of negotiation and bargaining.
VI. CONCLUSION
FERC's orders on remand in Devon Power and its subsequent orders addressing settlements have failed to recognize that settlement agreements are the result of negotiation and bargaining. FERC believed that it does not need to apply the Mobile-Sierra public interest presumption to future challenges to settlement rates. The effects of FERC's erroneous findings are potentially far-reaching because of the number of rate disputes that are resolved through settlement.
Parties to a settlement negotiate, often painstakingly, to reach a resolution that is agreeable to all parties. And, parties on both sides may "call that a bargain. The best [they] ever had." 351 The public interest presumption is intended to preserve for parties the benefits of their bargains and to provide much-needed stability to electric industry participants. FERC has undermined these goals. If Devon Power is not corrected by the courts, FERC and the electric industry will continuously confront the effects of this decision. 351 . THE WHO, Bargain, on WHO'S NEXT (Decca 1971).
